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Abstract—In ownership-based access control frameworks with
the possibility of delegating permissions and administrative
rights, delegation chains will form. There are different ways to
treat delegation chains when revoking rights, which give rise
to different revocation schemes. In this paper, we investigate
the problem of delegation revocation from the perspective of
the knowledge base paradigm. A knowledge base is a formal
specification of domain knowledge in a rich formal language.
Multiple forms of inference can be applied to this formal
specification in order to solve various problems and tasks that
arise in the domain. In other words, the paradigm proposes a
strict separation of concerns between information and problem
solving. The knowledge base that we use in this paper specifies the
effects of the various revocation schemes. By applying different
inferences to this knowledge base, we can solve the following
tasks: to determine the state of the system after a certain
delegation or revocation; to interactively simulate the progression
of the system state through time; to determine whether a user has
a certain permission or administrative right given a certain state
of the system; to verify invariants of the system; and to determine
which revocation schemes give rise to a certain specified set of
desired outcomes.
Index Terms—access control, delegation, revocation, KB
paradigm, formal specification, IDP
I. INTRODUCTION
In ownership-based frameworks for access control, it is
common to allow principals (users or processes) to grant both
permissions and administrative rights to other principals in the
system. Often it is desirable to grant a principal the right to
further grant permissions and administrative rights to other
principals. This may lead to delegation chains starting at a
source of authority (the owner of a resource) and passing on
certain permissions to other principals in the chain [1], [2],
[3], [4].
Furthermore, such frameworks commonly allow a principal
to revoke a permission that she granted to another principal [5],
[6], [3], [7]. Depending on the reasons for the revocation, dif-
ferent ways to treat the chain of principals whose permissions
depended on the second principal’s delegation rights can be
desirable [5], [8]. For example, if one is revoking a permission
given to an employee because he is moving to another position
in the company, it makes sense to keep the permissions of
principals who received them from this employee; but if one
is revoking a permission from a user who has abused his rights
and is hence distrusted by the user who granted the permission,
it makes sense to delete the permissions of principals who
received them from this user. Any algorithm that determines
which permissions to keep intact and which permissions to
delete when revoking a permission is called a revocation
scheme.
Hagstro¨m et al. [5] have presented a framework for clas-
sifying possible revocation schemes along three different
dimensions: the extent of the revocation to other grantees
(propagation), the effect on other grants to the same grantee
(dominance), and the permanence of the negation of rights
(resilience). Since there are two options along each dimen-
sion, there are in total eight different revocation schemes in
Hagstro¨m et al.’s framework. This classification was based on
revocation schemes that had been implemented in database
management systems [9], [10], [11], [12].
In this paper, we investigate the problem of delegation revo-
cation from the perspective of the knowledge base paradigm, a
declarative programming paradigm based on the idea of strictly
separating information and problem solving. A knowledge
base is a formal specification of domain knowledge in a
rich formal language. Multiple forms of inference can be
applied to this formal specification in order to solve various
problems and tasks that arise in the domain. The IDP system
is an implementation of the knowledge base paradigm with
associated formal language FO(·), an extension of first-order
logic [13] .
In this paper we present an application of the knowledge
base paradigm to delegation revocation, realized in the IDP
system. We have written a formal specification of the eight
revocation schemes in Hagstro¨m et al.’s framework, which
formally described their effects. By applying different infer-
ences to this specification, we can solve various tasks that can
be useful both for implementing a system which allows for
these revocation schemes and for supporting a user of such
a system: Given a certain state of the system and a certain
action (delegation or revocation), one inference determines
the state of the system after this action. Another inference
can interactively simulate the progression of the system state
through time. A third determines whether a user has a certain
permission or administrative right given a certain state of the
system. A fourth inference allows to verify that the system
satisfies certain invariants. Finally, there is an inference that
allows a user to specify a set of desired outcomes (e.g. that a
certain user should no longer have a certain right while another
user is unaffected) and determine which actions give rise to
this outcome.
This work constitutes a proof of concept, and we hope that it
will inspire other researchers in computer security to consider
the possibility of applying the methodology of the knowledge
base paradigm to their research.
The paper is structured as follows: We introduce Hagstro¨m
et al.’s delegation revocation framework in Section II. In
Section III we motivate and describe the knowledge base
paradigm, the IDP system and its specification language
FO(·). Section IV presents the application of the knowledge
base paradigm to Hagstro¨m et al.’s framework. Section V
discusses related work and section VI concludes.
II. THE DELEGATION REVOCATION FRAMEWORK
In this section we present Hagstro¨m et al.’s [5] delegation
revocation framework.
Let P be the set of principals (users or processes) in the
system, let O be the set of objects for which authorizations
can be stated, and let A be the set of access types, i.e. of
actions that principals may perform on objects. For every
object o ∈ O, there is a source of authority (SOA), for example
the owner of file o, which is a principal that has full power
over object o and is the ultimate authority with respect to
accesses to object o. For any a ∈ A and o ∈ O, the SOA of o
can grant the right to access a on object o to other principals
in the system, and can also delegate the right to grant access
and to grant this delegation right. Additionally, the framework
allows for negative authorizations, which can be used to block
a principal’s access or delegation rights without deleting any
authorization.
We assume that all authorizations in the system are stored in
an authorization specification, and that every authorization is
of the form (i, j, a, o, 〈sign〉, b1, b2), where i, j ∈ P , a ∈ A,
o ∈ O, 〈sign〉 is + or −, and b1 and b2 are booleans (T
or F ). The meaning of this authorization is that principal
i is granting some permission concerning access type a on
object o to principal j. If 〈sign〉 is +, then the permission
is a positive permission, else it is a negative permission. If
b1 is T , the permission contains the right to delegate the
permission further, i.e. to issue positive permissions. If b2 is T ,
the permission contains the right to issue negative permissions.
Since it does not make sense to combine a negative permission
with the right to delegate a positive or negative permission, b1
and b2 have to be both F if 〈sign〉 is −.
Hagstro¨m et al. define a permission to be a triple
(〈sign〉, b1, b2), where 〈sign〉 is + or −, and b1 and b2 are
booleans. They formalize the meaning of the two booleans b1
and b2 by defining a binary relation R between permissions.
R is defined to hold precisely for those pairs of permissions
shown in Table 1.1 Informally piRρ means that a principal
1Note that in [5], the definition of R also includes the pair
(+, F, T )R(+, F, F ) of permissions. The inclusion of this pair however
contradicts the informal explanations that Hagsto¨m et al. have given, so that
we assume that it was included by mistake.
(+, T, T )R(+, T, T )
(+, T, T )R(+, T, F )
(+, T, T )R(+, F, T )
(+, T, T )R(+, F, F )
(+, T, F )R(+, T, F )
(+, T, F )R(+, F, F )
(+, T, T )R(−, F, F )
(+, F, T )R(−, F, F )
TABLE I
DEFINITION OF R
with permission pi can grant permission ρ to other principals.
We say that a permission pi is stronger than a permission
ρ iff the set of permissions that a principal with permission
pi can grant is a strict superset of the set of permissions
that a principal with permission ρ can grant. So (+, T, T ) is
stronger than any other permission, and all permissions other
than (+, F, F ) and (−, F, F ) are stronger than both (+, F, F )
and (−, F, F ).2
Note that there is no interaction between the rights of
principals concerning different access-object pairs (a, o), so
we can consider a and o to be fixed for the rest of the
paper. For these two reasons, we simplify an authorization
(i, j, a, o,+, b1, b2) to (i, j,+, b1, b2).
A. Delegation chains and connectivity property
In this subsection we focus on the part of the system that
does not involve negative authorizations. In Subsection II-B
we will introduce negative authorizations.
Hagstro¨m et al. use the notion of a principal p having
a permission pi without formally defining it. The intended
meaning of this can be formalized using the notion of a rooted
delegation chain:3
Definition 1: A rooted delegation chain for principal i with
respect to permission pi is a sequence p1, . . . , pn of principals
satisfying the following properties:
1) p1 is the source of authority.
2) pn is i.
3) For every integer k such that 1 ≤ k < n, an authoriza-
tion (pk, pk+1,+, b
1
k, b
2
k) is in place.
4) For every integer k such that 1 ≤ k < n − 1, it holds
that (+, b1k, b
2
k)R(+, b
1
k+1, b
2
k+1).
5) (+, b1n−1, b
2
n−1) is stronger or equal to pi.
Definition 2: We say that a principal p has permission pi iff
there is a rooted delegation chain for principal p with respect
to permission pi.
Hagstro¨m et al.’s framework allows an authorization of the
form (i, j, 〈sign〉, b1, b2) to be in the authorization specifica-
tion only if i has a permission that allows i to grant this
authorization. This is called the connectivity property:
2Note that Hagstro¨m et al. use the word “stronger” in a different sense,
namely as a synonym for the relation R. This however is a rather misleading
way to use the word “stronger”. Hagstro¨m et al. do not define the notion that
we call “stronger”, but this notion is needed in order to formalize Hagstro¨m
et al.’s system.
3The idea to formalize Hagstro¨m et al.’s notion of having a permission in
this way was first proposed by Aucher et al. [14].
Connectivity property:
For every authorization (i, j, 〈sign〉, b1, b2) in the authoriza-
tion specification, i has a permission ρ with ρR(〈sign〉, b1, b2).
This property can be viewed as an invariant that any system
based on Hagstro¨m et al.’s framework needs to satisfy.
We visualize an authorization specification by a labelled
directed graph as in the following example:
A B C
D E
+, T, T +, T, F
+
, T, T
Fig. 1. Authorization specification visualized as labelled directed graph
In this example, in which A is the SOA (as in all forthcom-
ing examples), the principals A,B and D have permission
(+, T, T ), C has permission (+, T, F ), and E has no rights
concerning the access type and object in question.
B. Negative authorizations and inactivation of authorizations
A negative authorization from i to j can inactivate a positive
authorization from i to j without deleting it. Hagstro¨m et al.
[5] give two motivations for the use of negative authorizations:
They can make a revocation resilient, i.e. make its effect
time-persistent, and it can be used for temporarily taking
away rights from a user without deleting anything from the
authorization specification, so that it is easier to go back to
the state that was in place before this temporary removal of
rights.
Hagstro¨m et al. leave it open whether negative permissions
dominate positive ones or the other way round. If the system
has a positive-takes-precedence conflict resolution policy, then
positive permission take precedence; in this case, the resilient
effect of a negative authorization is not given, so the only
motivation to use negative authorizations in such a system
it for a temporary removal of rights. If the system has
a negative-takes-precedence conflict resolution policy, then
negative permission take precedence; in this case, the dis-
tinction (explained below) between weak negative revocations
and strong negative revocations disappears. In this paper, we
assume the system to have a system has a positive-takes-
precedence conflict resolution policy.
We assume the set of authorizations in the authorization
specification to be divided into a set of active authorizations
and a set of inactive authorizations. The revocation schemes
that revoke a right by issuing a negative authorization inacti-
vate some authorizations, i.e. turn some active authorizations
into inactive authorizations. Negative authorizations are always
active.
We define a rooted delegation chain to be active iff every
authorization in it is active. We say that a principal p actively
has permission pi iff there is an active rooted delegation chain
for principal p with respect to permission pi.
Additionally to the connectivity property mentioned, we can
also define an active connectivity property as follows:
Active-connectivity property:
For every active authorization (i, j, 〈sign〉, b1, b2) in the au-
thorization specification, i actively has a permission ρ with
ρR(〈sign〉, b1, b2).
Unlike the connectivity property, the active-connectivity
property is not mentioned by Hagstro¨m et al., but is actually
also an invariant of the system they define.
C. The three dimensions
Hagstro¨m et al. [5] have introduced three dimensions ac-
cording to which revocation schemes can be classified. These
are called propagation, dominance and resilience:
Propagation. The decision of a principal i to revoke an
authorization previously granted to a principal j may either
be intended to affect only the direct recipient j or to affect all
the other users in turn authorized by j. In the first case, we
say that the revocation is local, in the second case that it is
global.
Dominance. This dimension deals with the case when a
principal losing a permission in a revocation still has per-
missions from other grantors. If these other grantors’ are
dependent on the revoker, she can dominate these grantors
and revoke the permissions from them. This is called a
strong revocation. The revoker can also choose to make a
weak revocation, where permissions from other grantors to
a principal losing a permission are kept.
In order to formalize this dimension, we need to define what
we mean by a principal’s delegation rights to be independent
of another principal:
Definition 3: A principal j has delegation rights indepen-
dent of a principal i with respect to permission pi iff there is
an rooted delegation chain for j with respect to pi that does
not contain the principal i.
Resilience. This dimension distinguishes revocation by re-
moval of positive authorizations from revocation by negative
authorizations which just inactivate positive authorizations.
Given that we concentrate on the fragment of Hagstro¨m et al.’s
framework without negative revocations, we will not explain
this dimension in detail.
D. The revocation schemes
Since there are two options along each of the three di-
mensions, Hagstro¨m et al. defined eight different revocation
schemes. Below we give semi-formal explanations of these
eight revocation schemes. Fully formalized definitions are pro-
vided by the specification in Appendix A, which we describe
in Subsection IV-A. We illustrate each revocation scheme with
an example in which the authorization from A to B in the
following authorisation specification is revoked according to
the revocation scheme under consideration:
A B C
D E F
+, T, T
+
,
T
,
T
+, T, F
+
, T, T
+
,
F
,
F
+, T, T +, F, F
Fig. 2. Example authorization specification before revocation
1) Weak Local Delete: A Weak Local Delete (WLD) of a
positive authorization from i to j has the following effect:
1) The authorization from i to j is deleted.
2) If step 1 causes j to lose a permission, all authorizations
emerging from j that j is no longer entitled to grant are
deleted.
3) If j still has another permission, each authorization
deleted in step 2 is replaced by the strongest possible
authorization that j is entitled to grant and that is weaker
than the deleted authorization.
4) For every authorization (j, k,+, b1, b2) deleted in step
2, an authorization of the form (i, k,+, b1, b2) is issued.
Step 2 ensures that the connectivity property is satisfied at
j. This being a local revocation scheme, step 4 ensures that
all rights that users other than j had before the operation are
intact.
A B C
D E F
+, T, F
+
,
T
,
T
+, T, T
+
,
F
,
F
+, T, T +, F, F
Fig. 3. Weak Local Delete from A to B
In this example, the authorizations from B to C and from
B to E were deleted and not replaced by any authorization,
because the permission (+, F, F ) that B still has does no
entitle B to grant any authorization.
2) Weak Global Delete: A Weak Global Delete (WGD) of
a positive authorization from i to j has the following effect:
1) The authorization from i to j is deleted.
2) Recursively, any authorization emerging from a principal
k who loses a permission in step 1 or step 2 is deleted
and replaced by the strongest possible authorization that
k is entitled to grant and that is weaker than the deleted
authorization.
The recursive step 2 ensures that the connectivity property
is satisfied for the whole authorization specification after this
operation.
A B C
D E F
+
,
T
,
T
+
,
F
,
F
+, T, T +, F, F
Fig. 4. Weak Global Delete from A to B
3) Strong Local Delete: A Strong Local Delete (SLD) of a
positive authorization from i to j has the following effect:
1) The authorization from i to j is deleted.
2) Every authorization of the form (k, j,+, b1, b2) such that
k is not independent of i with respect to (b1, b2) is
deleted.
3) If steps 1 and 2 cause j to lose a permission, all
authorizations emerging from j that j is no longer
entitled to grant are deleted.
4) If j still has another permission, each authorization
deleted in step 3 is replaced by the strongest possible
authorization that j is entitled to grant and that is weaker
than the deleted authorization.
5) For every authorization (j, k,+, b1, b2) deleted in step
3, an authorization of the form (i, k,+, b1, b2) is issued.
The only difference to the Weak Local Delete is step 2, which
is the step that makes this a strong revocation scheme.
A B C
D E F
+, T, F
+
,
T
,
T
+, T, T
+, T, T +, F, F
Fig. 5. Strong Local Delete from A to B
4) Strong Global Delete: A Strong Global Delete (SGD)
of a positive authorization from i to j has the following effect:
1) The authorization from i to j is deleted.
2) Recursively, do the following
a) For any principal k who has lost a permission in
step 1, step 2.(a) or step 2.(c), all authorizations
emerging from k that k is no longer entitled to
grant are deleted.
b) If k still has another permission, each authorization
deleted in step 2.(a) is replaced by the strongest
possible authorization that k is entitled to grant
and that is weaker than the deleted authorization.
c) Any authorization of the form (l,m,+, b1, b2),
where m is a principal who loses a permission
in step 1, step 2.(a) or step 2.(c) and l is not
independent of i with respect to (b1, b2), is deleted.
Here the recursive deletion procedure contains two different
kinds of deletions: 2.(a) makes it a global revocation scheme
and 2.(c) makes it a strong revocation scheme.
A B C
D E F
+
,
T
,
T
Fig. 6. Strong Global Delete from A to B
5) Negative revocations: The negative revocations are sim-
ilar to the positive revocations, only that instead of deleting
positive authorizations, we inactivate them by issuing negative
authorizations. We show this on the example of the Weak
Local Negative. The other three negative revocation schemes
are adapted versions of the corresponding delete revocations
in a similar way.
A Weak Local Negative (WLN) of a positive authorization
from i to j has the following effect:
1) The negative authorization (i, j,−, F, F ) is added to the
authorization specification.
2) Any positive authorization from i to j is inactivated.
3) If step 2 causes a permission of j to ne inactivated,
all authorizations emerging from j that j is no longer
entitled to grant are inactivated.
4) If j still actively has another permission, each autho-
rization deleted in step 3 is replaced by the strongest
possible authorization that j is entitled to grant and that
is weaker than the inactivated authorization.
5) For every authorization (j, k, b1, b2) inactivated by step
3, an authorization of the form (i, k, b1, b2) is issued.
Unlike in the Weak Local Delete, we do not delete any au-
thorizations, but just inactivate them. We graphically represent
inactivated authoriazations by dashed lines.
A B C
D E F
+, T, F
−, F, F
+, T, T
+
,
T
,
T
+, T, T
+, T, F
+
, T, T
+
,
F
,
F
+, T, T +, F, F
Fig. 7. Weak Local Negative from A to B
III. THE KNOWLEDGE BASE PARADIGM AND
THE FO(·) KB PROJECT
Declarative systems have proven their merit in many ap-
plication domains: From planning to scheduling to security
contexts, many challenges have been tackled using declarative
approach. For example, Barker et al. [15] used a rule-based
approach to determine access rights in an access control
system. Advantages of such an approach are readability and
maintainability of a specification. However, only one task is
supported in a rule based system, or in any other decalarative
system. Every system has its own syntactical style, terminol-
ogy, conceptualization, and designated style of inference (rule
based systems do chaining, databases do querying, answer set
programming generates answer sets, etc.). Yet, in all of them,
propositions need to be expressed. Take, e.g., “each lecture
takes place at some time slot”. This proposition could be an
expression to be deduced from a formal specification if the task
was a verification problem, or to be queried in a database, or
it could be a constraint for a scheduling problem. It is, in the
first place, just a piece of information and we see no reason
why depending on the task to be solved, it should be expressed
in a different formalism.
The knowledge base (KB) paradigm [16] was proposed as
an answer to this. The KB paradigm applies a strict separation
of concerns to information and problem solving. A KB system
allows information to be stored in a knowledge base, and
provides a range of inference methods. With these inference
methods various types of problems and tasks can be solved
using the same knowledge base. As such the knowledge
base is neither a program nor a description of a problem,
it cannot be executed or run. It is nothing but information.
However, this information can be used to solve multiple sorts
of problems. Many declarative problem solving paradigms are
mono-inferential: they are based on one form of inference. In
comparison, the KB paradigm is multi-inferential.
The FO(·) KB project is a research project in which an
implementation of the KB paradigm is being developed. Its
aim is to integrate different useful language constructs and
forms of inference from different declarative paradigms in one
rich declarative language and a KB system. So far, it has led
to the KB language FO(·) [17] and the KB system IDP [13]
, which are used in this paper.
A. The specification language FO(·)
FO(·) refers to a class of extensions of first-order logic
(FO). The language of the current version of the IDP system
(IDP 3) is FO(T, ID, Agg, arit, PF): FO extended with types,
inductive definitions, aggregates, arithmetic and partial func-
tions (see [17], [18]). In this work, we will only work (and as
such, introduce) a subset of this language: FO(T, ID): typed
first-order logic with inductive definitions. Abusing notation,
we will use FO(·) as an abbreviation of this language.
B. An FO(·) specification
A specification of domain knowledge in FO(·) can consist
of 3 types of building blocks: a vocabulary Σ, a theory T and
a (partial) structure S.
a) Vocabulary Σ.: A vocabulary is a declaration of the
symbols used in the associated theories and structures. It is a
set Σ of type symbols (denoted as ΣT ) and predicate symbols
(denoted as ΣP ). Every predicate P of arity n has a fixed type
[τ1, . . . , τn], where τ1, . . . , τn are type symbols. Variables,
atoms and first-order formulas are defined as usual.
b) Theory T .: A theory is a set of first-order formulas
and inductive definitions. An inductive definition ∆ in FO(·)
is a set of rules δ of the form P (t)← ϕ, with ϕ a first-order
formula. We call P (t¯) the head (head(δ)) and ϕ the body
(body(δ)) of the rule. The symbols that occur in the head of
a rule δ in ∆ are called the defined symbols in ∆. All other
symbols that occur in ∆ are called the parameters of ∆. The
semantics used for inductive definitions is the well-founded
semantics; as argued in [17], this captures the intended mean-
ing of all forms of inductive definitions commonly used in
mathematics and computer science. A structure S satisfies ∆ if
the interpretation of a defined predicate P in the well-founded
model of S, constructed relative to the restriction of S to the
parameters of ∆, is exactly the relation PS .
The following example illustrates the use of an inductive
definition in a theory by presenting the defintion of “reachable”
in FO(·).
Example 1: Assume a vocabulary containing a type
Node, and two predicates: Edge(Node,Node) and
Reachable(Node,Node). Informally, Edge states that
there is an edge between two nodes, while Reachable states
that there is a path of edges between two nodes. We define
what reachability means in terms of the edges, using an
inductive definition ∆ in FO(·):


∀x : Reachable(x, x).
∀x y : Reachable(x, y)←∃z : Reachable(x, z) ∧
Edge(z, y).
.


c) Structure S.: Given a vocabularyΣ, a partial structure
gives an interpretation to (a subset of) the elements of Σ.
Before we define formally what an interpretation is, we define
the concept of a partial set, which is a generalisation of a set
in a 3-valued context: A partial set on domain D is a function
from D to {t,u, f}. A partial set is two-valued (or total) if u
does not belong to its range. A (partial) structure S consists
of a domain Dτ for all types τ in ΣT and an assignment of a
partial set PS to each predicate or function symbol P ∈ ΣP ,
called the interpretation of P in S. The interpretation PS of
a predicate symbol P with type [τ1, . . . , τn] in S is a partial
set on domain Dτ1 × . . .×Dτn .
In case the interpretation of a predicate P in S is a two-
valued set, we abuse notation and use PS as shorthand for
{d|PS(d) = t}.
We call a partial structure total if the interpretation PS of
every predicate symbol P ∈ ΣP is a total set. Note that with
the abuse of notation just explained, a total structure as we
have defined it can be identified with a first-order structure as
it is usually defined.
Given two partial structures S = (D, I) and S ′ = (D, I ′),
we write S ≤p S
′ (and say S is more precise than S′, or S′
expands S) iff for every predicate symbol P ∈ ΣP with type
[τ1, . . . , τn] and every tuple d¯ ∈ Dτ1 × . . . × Dτn such that
P I(d¯) 6= u, we have P I
′
(d¯) = P I(d¯).
C. The reasoning engine
In the FO(·) KB project, a implementation of a KB System
was developed: the IDP system [13] . IDP takes an FO(·)
specification (that is, a combination of vocabularies, theories
and/or structures) and can do a number of reasoning tasks,
by applying a suitable form of inference on this specification.
Below, we present the inferences that we need in this paper:
• Modelexpand(T,S): Input: theory T and partial structure
S. Output: either a total structure I such that I is a
model of T and S ≤p I , or UNSAT if there is no such I .
Modelexpand [19] is a generalization for FO(·) theories
of the modelexpansion task as defined in Mitchell et
al. [20].
• Allmodels(T,S): Input: theory T and partial structure S.
Output: the set of all total structures I such that I is a
model of T and S ≤p I .
• Query(S, E): Input: a (partial) structure S and a set
expression E = {x | ϕ(x)}. Output: the set AQ = {x |
ϕ(x)S = t}.
• Progression(T,Si): In [21], LTC theories (Linear Time
Calculus) are proposed, a syntactic subclass of FO(·)
theories that allow to naturally model dynamic systems.
An LTC theory consists of three types of constraints:
constraints about the initial situation, invariants, and
“bistate” formulas that relate the state on the current point
in time with that of the next. Note that the specification
presented in Subsection IV-A below is an LTC theory.
The Progression inference: Input: an LTC theory T and
a structure Si that provides information about the state
of the system on a time point t. Output: a structure St+1
that represents the next state (or a next possible state) at
time point t+1. Repeating this process, we can compute
all subsequent states, effectively simulating the dynamic
system defined by T .
IV. DELEGATION REVOCATION IN THE KB PARADIGM
In this section, we explain how the KB paradigm can be
applied to delegation revocation. For this purpose, we show
how the delegation revocation framework defined in Section
II can be specified in FO(·), and how inferences on this
specification can solve various tasks that arise in the domain.
Some of these tasks are tasks that any system implementing the
delegation revocation framework needs to solve, while others
are tasks that support a user of such a system.
We have built a prototype in IDP in which this ap-
plication of the KB paradigm is realized. This prototype
also covers the negative authorizations and negative re-
vocation schemes that this paper does not explain due
to space restrictions. This prototype can be downloaded
at http://icr.uni.lu/mcramer/downloads/hagstrom-RDS.zip and
run in IDP 3.
A. The FO(·) specification of the delegation revocation frame-
work
In this subsection, we describe how Hagstro¨m et al.’s
delegation revocation framework, which we defined semi-
formally in Section II, can be formally specified in FO(·).
The full specification can be found in Appendix A. Both in
this subsection and in the appendix, we use IDP syntax for
FO(·): The symbols &, |, ˜, ! and ? mean ∧, ∨, ¬, ∀ and
∃ respectively, and the symbol sequence <- means ← (in
inductive definitions).
The FO(·) specification models the change of the autho-
rization specification over time. Principals are modelled as
objects of the theory’s domain, whereas positive authorizations
are modelled by the predicate pos_auth. The authorizations
cannot be modelled as objects, because they change over time,
while FO(·) assumes a constant domain of objects.
We allow for four types of objects: Time, principal,
scheme and permission. Time points are integers. There
is a constant SOA of type principal that denotes the
source of authority. The type scheme consists of the four
delete revocation schemes (WLD, WGD, SLD and SGD), the
four negative revocation schemes (WLN, WGN, SLN, SGN) and
four schemes for granting the four different kinds of permis-
sions (grantTT, grantTF, grantFT and grantFF). The
permissions are TT, TF, FT and FF. The sign is not part of the
permission, because the information provided by the sign is
included in the choice between pos_auth and neg_auth.
As IDP only works with finite domains, the type Time
actually just consists of a finite set of consecutive integers.
There is a constant Start for the first time point, i.e. the
smallest integer in the domain of time points in a given
structure. The unary partial function Next maps a time point
t to the next time point t+1, as long as t is not the last time
point included in the domain.
The predicate pos_auth for positive authorizations takes
four arguments: pos_auth(t,i,j,a) means that at time
t, a positive authorization from principal i to principal j
for permission a is in place. The predicate neg_auth, on
the other hand, only takes three arguments, as no perms-
sion needs to be specified for a negative authorization:
neg_auth(t,i,j) means that at time t, a negative au-
thorization from principal i to principal j is in place. There
are two predicates, the tertiary pos_auth_start and the
binary neg_auth_start, for specifying the positive and
negative authorizations that are in place at the first time point
Start.
Changes in the authorization specification are always trig-
gered by some action by a principal: action(t,s,i,j)
means that at time t, principal i performs an action of
the (revocation or grant) scheme s affecting principal j.
In the case of delete revocations and grants, these actions
can lead to authorizations being deleted and/or new autho-
rizations being included in the authorization specification.
delete(t,i,j,a) means that between time points t-1
and t, the positive authorization from i to j for permission
a gets deleted. new(t,i,j,a) means that between time
points t-1 and t, a new positive authorization from i to j
for permission a gets added to the authorization specification.
pos_auth is defined inductively by setting its values at the
first time point Start to the start configuration specified by
pos_auth_start, and by modifying its values between
time t and t+1 according to the changes specified by
delete and new:
{ p o s a u t h ( S t a r t , p1 , p2 , a ) <−
p o s a u t h s t a r t ( p 1 , p2 , a ) .
p o s a u t h (N e x t ( t ) , p1 , p2 , a ) <−
po s a u t h ( t , p1 , p2 , a ) &
∼d e l e t e ( N e x t ( t ) , p1 , p2 , a ) .
p o s a u t h (N e x t ( t ) , p1 , p2 , a ) <−
new(Nex t ( t ) , p1 , p2 , a ) .}
Additionally, there are predicates FF_delete and
new_FF that specify changes on the negative authorizations,
and FF is defined in a way analogous to pos_auth using
these change predicated instead of delete and new.
The predicate chain(t,i,a) expresses that at time t,
there exists a rooted delegation chain for principal i with
respect to permission a. In Section II, rooted delegation chains
are defined by quantifying over sequences of principals. This
is in effect a second-order quantification, which is not possible
in the first-order language FO(·). However, chain(t,i,a)
can be equivalently defined through an inductive definition as
follows:4
{ c h a i n ( t ,SOA, TT) .
c h a i n ( t , p1 , a1 ) <−
? p2 : c h a i n ( t , p2 , a ) &
po s a u t h ( t , p2 , p1 , a1 ) &
R(a , a1 ) .
c h a i n ( t , p , a ) <−
c h a i n ( t , p , a1 ) &
S t r o ng e r ( a 1 , a ) . }
The predicate can_grant(t,i,a) expresses that princi-
pal i has a permission that entitles him to grant the permission
a. The predicate ind(t,i,j,a) models the independence
of principal i from principal j with respect to a permission
a, and the access right of principal i. These two predicates
are defined as follows:
{ c a n g r a n t ( t , i , a ) <−
? a1 : c h a i n ( t , i , a1 ) & R(a1 , a ) .}
{ i n d ( t , SOA, p , a ) <−
∼ SOA = p .
i n d ( t , p1 , p2 , a ) <−
∼ p1 = p2
& ?p : i n d ( t , p , p2 , a1 ) &
po s a u t h ( t , p , p1 , a ) &
( a=TT | a=TF ) &
R(a1 , a ) .}
Analogously to chain and
can_grant, there are predicates
active_chain and can_actively_grant that
additionally take care of the authorizations in the chain being
active.
The different effects of the different deletion revocation
schemes are captured by the definitions of the predicates
delete, inactive and new. delete is defined via an
inductive definition with four clauses:
{ d e l e t e ( N e x t ( t ) , i , j , a ) <−
po s a u t h ( t , i , j , a ) &
a c t i o n ( t , s , i , j ) &
( s =WLD | s=SLD | s=WGD | s=SGD) .
d e l e t e ( N e x t ( t ) , i , j , a ) <−
po s a u t h ( t , i , j , a ) &
∼ c a n g r a n t ( N e x t ( t ) , i , a ) .
d e l e t e ( N e x t ( t ) , k , j , a ) <−
po s a u t h ( t , k , j , a ) &
a c t i o n ( t , SLD, i , j ) &
? a1 : ( i n d ( t , k , i , a1 )& R(a1 , a ) ) .
d e l e t e ( N e x t ( t ) , z ,w, a ) <−
4Note that first-order logic with inductive definitions has an expressivity that
lies strictly between the expressivity of first-order and second-order logic.
po s a u t h ( t , z ,w, a ) &
a c t i o n ( t , SGD, i , j ) &
d e l e t e ( N e x t ( t ) , p ,w, a1 ) &
∼ ? a2 : ( i n d ( t , z , i , a2 ) &
R(a2 , a ) ) .}
The first clause just states that in any deletion revocation
scheme from i to j, the positive authorization from i to
j is deleted. The second clause defines the propagation of
deletion by specifying that any positive authorization from i
to j gets deleted if i is losing its delegation right. The last two
clauses capture the meaning of strong vs. weak dominance by
specifying the additional deletions that are needed in strong
revocation schemes.
The predicate inactive specifies which authorizations
are inactive. The conditions for inactivating authorizations are
analogous to the conditions for deleting authorization, only
that they come into play in negative revocations rather than in
delete revocations:
{ i n a c t i v e ( N e x t ( t ) , i , j , a ) <−
a c t i o n ( t , s , i , j ) &
pos pe rm(Nex t ( t ) , i , j , a ) &
( s =WLN | s=SLN | s=WGN | s=SGN) .
i n a c t i v e ( t , j , k , a ) <−
pos perm( t , j , k , a ) &
∼ c a n a c t i v e l y g r a n t ( t , j , a ) .
i n a c t i v e ( N e x t ( t ) , z , j , a ) <−
? i : a c t i o n ( t , r s , i , j ) &
( r s =SLN | r s =SGN) &
pos perm( t , z , j , a ) &
∼ ? a1 : ( i n d ( t , z , i , a1 )& R(a1 , a ) ) .
i n a c t i v e ( N e x t ( t ) , z ,w, a ) <−
a c t i o n ( t , SGN, i , j ) &
i n a c t i v e ( N e x t ( t ) , p ,w, a1 ) &
∼ i n a c t i v e ( t , p ,w, a1 )&
pos perm( t , z ,w, a ) &
∼ ? a2 : ( i n d ( t , z , i , a2 )& R(a2 , a ) ) .
i n a c t i v e ( N e x t ( t ) , i , j , a ) <−
i n a c t i v e ( t , i , j , a ) &
pos pe rm(Nex t ( t ) , i , j , a ) . }
The last clause of inactive specifies that an inactivated
authorization stays inactive. If an action of undoing a negative
revocation was included in the framework, this clause would
have to be modified so as to allow for reactivation. But since
Hagstro¨m et al. do not define such an undoing of negative
revocations, we do not include it in our formal specification
of their framework either.
The meaning of local vs. global propagation is captured
by the inductive definition of the predicate new. It consists
of four clauses which take care of four different reasons for
adding new authorizations. For simplicity, we only present two
of these clauses here:
new(Nex t ( t ) , i , j , a ) <−
? ds : ( d s =gran tTT | ds=gran tTF |
ds=gran tFT | ds=g r an tFF ) &
a c t i o n ( t , ds , i , j ) &
Re l a t i o n ( a , ds )&
c a n a c t i v e l y g r a n t ( t , i , a ) &
∼ ? a1 : ( c a n a c t i v e l y g r a n t ( t , i , a1 ) &
Re l a t i o n ( a 1 , ds ) & S t r o ng e r ( a 1 , a ) ) .
n ew(Nex t ( t ) , i , k , a ) <−
? j s : ( s =WLD | s=SLD) &
a c t i o n ( t , s , i , j ) &
( ? z : p o s a u t h ( t , z , k , a ) &
c a n g r a n t ( t , z , a ) ) &
∼( ? z : p o s a u t h ( t , z , k , a ) &
c a n g r a n t ( N e x t ( t ) , z , a ) ) .
The first clause ensures that new positive authorizations are
added when a granting action is performed by a principal.5
The second clause takes care of adding the authorizations that
are added in the last item of each of the definitions of Weak
Local Delete and Strong Local Delete in Section II. Informally,
this clause says that if in a local revocation scheme revoking
a positive authorization from principal i to principal j, j is
losing its delegation right, then every positive authorization
from j to another principal k must be replaced by a positive
authorization of the same authorization type from i to k. This
new authorization from i to k ensure that the propagation
defined in the second clause of the definition of delete does
not continue beyond j.
The predicate access_right(t,i)means that principal
i has access right at time t:
{ a c c e s s r i g h t ( t , p ) <−
a c t i v e c h a i n ( t , p , a ) .
a c c e s s r i g h t ( t , p ) <−
? p1 : c a n a c t i v e l y g r a n t ( t , p1 , a )&
po s a u t h ( t , p1 , p , a ) &
∼ i n a c t i v e ( t , p1 , p , a ) .}
B. Using inferences to solve various tasks
In this subsection we explain how different logical in-
ferences, when applied to the FO(·) specification explained
above, can solve various tasks that can be useful both for
implementing a system which allows for delegation revocation
and for supporting a user of such a system.
Let us first consider tasks that a system that implements
Hagstro¨m et al.’s delegation revocation framework needs to
solve. Given a certain state of the system, defined by which
authorizations are currently included in the authorization
specification, and a given action (a delegation or revocation
performed by some principal), the new state of the system after
this action needs to be determined. This task can be performed
using the Modelexpand inference as follows: Let T be the
FO(·) specification of the delegation revocation framework.
Let S be a partial structure with the following properties:
• The time domain of S contains only the two time points
0 and 1.
• S assigns to the predicate pos_auth_start the set of
all authorizations currently included in the authorization
specification.
• S assigns to the predicate action the given action at
time 0.
• The value of all other predicates is undefined in S.
5The last tree conditions in this first clause ensure that when i cannot grant
permission a, the strongest permission that i can grant and that is still weaker
than a will actually be granted.
In this case, Modelexpand(T ,S) is a total structure that ex-
pands S and that is a model of T . Being a total structure,
it assigns to pos_auth a set A of quintuples of the form
(t, i, j, 〈sign〉, a), where t is a time point (0 or 1), i and j are
principals, 〈sign〉 is a sign, and a is a permission. Then the set
A′ := {(i, j, 〈sign〉, a) | (1, i, j, 〈sign〉, a) ∈ A} is the set of
authorizations that constitutes the authorization specification
after the action. (Note that since all predicates other than
pos_auth_start and action are defined in T through an
inductive definition, there is a unique model of T that expands
S, so that the result of this inference is deterministic.)
This way we can determine the effect of a single action. It
could be iterated by setting the value of pos_auth_start
to be A′ for the next iteration of this procedure. But the IDP
system also supports an inference, namely the Progression in-
ference, that is designed for this kind of temporal progression
of a structure based on a theory with a type for time. The
input structure of this inference provides information about
the state of the system on a time point t; in our case that
is the authorization specification at a given time. The output
is a structure that represents the state of the authorization
specification at time point t+ 1. So the step of extracting A′
from A that was required for iterating the above inference is
no longer needed. So this inference can more straightforwardly
be iterated, giving rise to an interactive simulation of the
progression of the system state through time.
Of course, a system implementing Hagstro¨m et al.’s frame-
work does not only need to determine how the authorization
specification changes over time, but also needs to determine
whether a principal requesting access or performing a certain
administrative action actually has access right or the right to
perform the action in question. This can be done with the
Query inference: For example, if S is the partial structure
that assigns to the predicate pos_auth_start the set
of all authorizations currently included in the authorization
specification, Query(S,{i | access_right(Start,i)})
returns the set of principals that have access right according
to the current authorization specification.
When designing a system, one can avoid an erroneous
design by specifying invariants that the system must satisfy at
any moment during the execution of the system, and verify that
these invariants are actually satisfied by the system. In the case
of a system based on Hagstro¨m et al.’s delegation revocation
system, examples of invariants that the system must satisfy are
the connectivity property and the active-connectivity property
defined in subsections II-A and II-B. We must, of course
assume, that the system starts in a state that satisfies these
two properties. All that remains to be shown, then, is that if
the connectivity property holds at some time point t, it must
also hold at the next time point t + 1, and similarly for the
active-connectivity property.
One way that this can be done is by calling an automated
theorem prover to prove this implication. However, this is
not always viable, as the theory may be too complex for an
automated theorem prover to be able to find a proof of the
invariant. This is the case for our specification.
Another possibility is to prove that the invariant holds in
fixed structures. In our case, we can fix a partial structure S
with time points 0 and 1 and without any information about
the predicates. In this case, the only information that we are
fixing is the number of principals. We can then prove that the
invariant holds for a fixed number of principals by establishing,
using Modelexpand(T ′,S), that there is no total structure
expanding S that is a model of the theory T ′ consisting
of our specification T together with the statement that the
connectivity property holds at time point 0 but not at time
point 1. With this method, we have verified the connectivity
property for any system with n principals for n ≤ 8.
Despite this limitation to very small domains, this limited
verification can be useful for avoiding erroneous design, as
errors tend to already show up at relatively small domains.
It should be added that the logical methodology of the KB
paradigm lends itself well to the usage of interactive theorem
provers common in software verification in order to fully
verify invariants over complex specifications. The integration
of IDP and interactive theorem provers is, however, still future
work.
Finally, let us turn to a task that supports a user of a system
based on Hagstro¨m et al.’s delegation revocation framework:
A principal i may want to reach a certain outcome, e.g. that a
given principal j should no longer have a certain right while
another principal k is unaffected. i may want to find out all
revocation schemes that lead to the desired outcome. This can
be achieved by computing Allmodels(T2,S), where S is the
structure that assigns the current authorization specification to
pos_auth_start, and T2 is the theory consisting of our
specification of the delegation revocation framework together
with the statement that the action at time point 0 is performed
by i, and the statement that the desired outcome holds at time
point 1. The values of the predicate action at time point
0 in the models returned by Allmodels(T2,S) are the actions
that i can perform in order to get the desired outcome.
Furthermore, i may want to reach a certain outcome for
some given principals while minimally influencing the per-
missions of other principals. In that case, i can define a
cost function, e.g. that every change in a permission of a
principal has a cost of 1, and search the models returned by
Allmodels(T2,S) for the one with the minimal cost.
The IDP prototype that we have built can perform all the
different tasks described in this subsection.
V. RELATED WORK
While the KB paradigm and its implementation IDP, are
fairly young, its applicability has been investigated and il-
lustrated in multiple domains. In [22], the connection with
Business Rules was investigated. Business Rules are well-
represented in industry for knowledge-intensive applications
and as such were used as a comparison to evaluate the KB
paradigm. A typical Business Rules application, the EU-Rent
Car-Rental company, was modelled in FO(·), and two use
cases were investigated.
In [23], the authors looked at applications of the IDP
system, for interactive configuration systems, where the system
is used to guide a user through a search space, looking for
a valid configuration. The advantages of an explicit model-
ing of domain knowledge in configuration were large: the
adaptability in case the domain knowledge changes and the
fact that the same specification of knowledge could be reused
in different tasks being the most important. This work was
extended in [24], where eight different reasoning tasks used
in a configuration system were identified and implemented
using logical inferences on 1 knowledge base, containing all
domain knowledge.
While the KB paradigm has not been previously applied to
the problem of delegation revocation, other logical methods
have been applied to this access control problem: Aucher et al.
[14] presented a formalization of Hagstro¨m et al.’s eight revo-
cation schemes in a dynamic variant of propositional logic that
resembles imperative programming languages. Furthermore,
they extended their formalization with a notion of trust. Unlike
our specification, which specifies the eight revocation schemes
by specifying the formal properties of the three dimensions
of the classification, their formalization defines each of the
eight revocation schemes separately. Their formalization only
supports the tasks of determining the state of the system after
a certain action and of determining whether a user has a
certain permission given a certain state of the system; the
other tasks described in this paper are not supported by their
formalization.
The main author of the current paper has defined a modified
version of Hagstro¨m et al.’s delegation revocation framework
[25] as well as Trust Delegation Logic, a logic of trust designed
for studying the reasons for performing different revocation
schemes defined [8]. This work was motivated by problems
we encountered with Hagstro¨m et al.’s delegation revocation
framework when we produced the first FO(·) specification
of the framework; these problems are documented in [25],
[8] and [26]. In general, it should be noted that formally
specifying something in FO(·) can help understanding it better
and uncovering problematic features. As a further example
of this, our work on FO(·) specifications of delegation re-
vocation frameworks has also shown us that Aucher et al.’s
[14] formalization actually deviates from Hagstro¨m et al.’s
delegation revocation framework in multiple respects (see [26]
for details).
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have explained the benefits of the knowl-
edge base paradigm when applied to delegation revocation.
The knowledge base paradigm proposes a strict separation
between knowledge and problem solving. In our application,
the knowledge is represented by an FO(·) specification of
Hagstro¨m et al. [5] delegation revocation framework. By ap-
plying various logical inferences to this specification, multiple
tasks that arise when implementing or using a delegation re-
vocation system were solved. This way, the same information
was reused for solving various problems.
Our work constitutes a proof of concept, and we hope that it
will inspire other researchers in computer security to consider
the possibility of applying the methodology of the knowledge
base paradigm to their research.
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APPENDIX
{ c h a i n ( t , SOA, TT) .
c h a i n ( t , p1 , a1 ) <− ? p2 : c h a i n ( t , p2 , a ) &
pos perm( t , p2 , p1 , a1 ) &
R(a , a1 ) .
c h a i n ( t , p , a ) <− c h a i n ( t , p , a1 ) &
S t r o ng e r ( a 1 , a ) . }
{ a c t i v e c h a i n ( t , SOA, TT) .
a c t i v e c h a i n ( t , p1 , a1 ) <− ? p2 :
a c t i v e c h a i n ( t , p2 , a ) &
pos perm( t , p2 , p1 , a1 ) &
R(a , a1 ) &
∼ i n a c t i v e ( t , p2 , p1 , a1 ) .
a c t i v e c h a i n ( t , p , a ) <− a c t i v e c h a i n ( t ,
p , a1 ) &
S t r o ng e r ( a 1 , a ) . }
{ c a n g r a n t ( t , i , a ) <− ? a1 : c h a i n ( t , i , a1 ) &
R(a1 , a ) . }
{ c a n a c t i v e l y g r a n t ( t , i , a ) <− ? a1 :
a c t i v e c h a i n ( t , i , a1 ) &
R(a1 , a ) . }
{ i n d ( t , SOA, p , a ) <− SOA ∼= p .
i n d ( t , p1 , p2 , a ) <− p1 ∼= p2 &
?p : i n d ( t , p , p2 , a1 ) &
pos perm( t , p , p1 , a ) &
( a=TT | a=TF ) &
R(a1 , a ) . }
{ a c c e s s r i g h t ( t , p ) <− a c t i v e c h a i n ( t , p , a ) .
a c c e s s r i g h t ( t , p ) <− ? p1 :
c a n a c t i v e l y g r a n t ( t , p1 , a ) &
pos perm( t , p1 , p , a ) &
∼ i n a c t i v e ( t , p1 , p , a ) . }
/ / Here we d e f i n e which a u t h o r i z a t i o n s t o
d e l e t e under t h e d i f f e r e n t d e l e t e
r e v o c a t i o n schemes
{ d e l e t e ( N e x t ( t ) , i , j , a )<− pos perm( t , i , j , a ) &
a c t i o n ( t , s , i , j ) &
( s =WLD | s=SLD | s=WGD | s=SGD) .
/ / Def ine d e l e t i o n v i a r o o t e d d e l e g a t i o n
c h a i n s :
d e l e t e ( N e x t ( t ) , j , k , a )<−pos perm( t , j , k , a ) &
∼ c a n g r a n t ( N e x t ( t ) , j , a ) . / /We don ’ t use
c a n a c t i v e l y g r a n t here , be cau s e
even an i n a c t i v e d e l e g a t i o n cha i n
can p r e v e n t d e l e t i o n
/ / Ex t r a d e l e t i o n r u l e f o r S t r ong Loca l
De l e t e scheme :
d e l e t e ( N e x t ( t ) , k , j , a )<−a c t i o n ( t , SLD, i , j ) &
pos perm( t , k , j , a ) &
∼ ? a1 : ( i n d ( t , k , i , a1 )& R(a1 , a ) ) .
/ / Ex t r a d e l e t i o n r u l e f o r S t r ong Globa l
De l e t e scheme :
d e l e t e ( N e x t ( t ) , z ,w, a )<−a c t i o n ( t , SGD, i , j ) &
d e l e t e ( N e x t ( t ) , p ,w, a1 ) &
pos perm( t , z ,w, a ) &
∼ ? a2 : ( i n d ( t , z , i , a2 )& R(a2 , a ) ) . }
{ / / A d e l e g a t i o n scheme l e a d s t o a new
p o s i t i v e a u t h o r i z a t i o n i f t h e p r i n c i p a l
pe r f o rm ing i t has t h e r i g h t t o g r a n t such
an a u t h o r i z a t i o n :
new(Nex t ( t ) , i , j , a ) <− ? ds : ( d s =
gran tTT | ds=gran tTF | ds=gran tFT
| ds=g r an tFF ) &
a c t i o n ( t , ds , i , j ) &
/ / The f o l l ow i ng t h r e e c o n d i t i o n s
e n s u r e t h a t when i c anno t g r a n t
p e rm i s s i o n a , t h e s t r o n g e s t
p e rm i s s i o n t h a t i can g r a n t and
t h a t i s s t i l l weaker t han a w i l l
a c t u a l l y be g r a n t e d :
R e l a t i o n ( a , ds )&
c a n a c t i v e l y g r a n t ( t , i , a ) &
∼ ? a1 : ( c a n a c t i v e l y g r a n t ( t , i , a1 ) &
Re l a t i o n ( a 1 , ds ) & S t r o ng e r ( a 1 , a ) ) .
/ / I n l o c a l r e v o c a t i o n schemes , i f an
a u t h o r i z a t i o n from i t o z i s r evoked
and an a u t h o r i z a t i o n from z t o a no t h e r
node k i s g e t t i n g d e l e t e d , t h e r e shou l d
be a new a u t h o r i z a t i o n from i t o k .
new(Nex t ( t ) , i , k , a ) <− ? j s : ( s =WLD | s=SLD
| s=WLN | s=SLN) &
a c t i o n ( t , s , i , j ) &
/ / check t h a t t h e r e was an a c t i v e
a u t h o r i z a t i o n from z t o k
a u t h o r i z a t i o n was a c t i v e :
( ? z : pos pe rm( t , z , k , a ) &
c a n a c t i v e l y g r a n t ( t , z , a ) ) &
/ / and t h a t t h e a u t h o r i z a t i o n i s i s
abou t t o be d e l e t e d or
i n a c t i v a t e d :
∼( ? z : pos pe rm( t , z , k , a ) &
c a n a c t i v e l y g r a n t ( N e x t ( t ) , z , a ) ) .
/ / An a u t h o r i z a t i o n from j t o k t h a t
g e t s d e l e t e d becaus e j l o s e s he r
r i g h t t o g r a n t i t g e t s r e p l a c e d by
t h e s t r o n g e s t a u t h o r i z a t i o n t h a t
j can g r a n t and t h a t i s weaker
t han t h e d e l e t e d a u t h o r i z a t i o n .
new(Nex t ( t ) , j , k , a1 ) <− pos perm( t , j , k ,
a ) &
∼c a n g r a n t ( N e x t ( t ) , j , a ) &
c a n g r a n t ( N e x t ( t ) , j , a1 ) &
S t r o ng e r ( a , a1 ) &
/ / a1 i s t h e s t r o n g e s t p o s s i b l e
a u t h o r i z a t i o n t h a t j can g r a n t :
∼ ? a2 : ( c a n g r a n t ( N e x t ( t ) , j , a2 ) &
S t r o ng e r ( a , a2 ) & S t r o ng e r ( a 2 , a1 ) )
.
/ / The same as above bu t f o r i n a c t i v a t i o n
r a t h e r t h an d e l e t i o n of t h e
a u t h o r i z a t i o n from j t o k :
new(Nex t ( t ) , j , k , a1 ) <− ? i RS : (RS=WLN | RS=
WGN) &
a c t i o n ( t , RS , i , j ) &
pos perm( t , j , k , a ) &
c a n a c t i v e l y g r a n t ( N e x t ( t ) , j , a ) &
c a n a c t i v e l y g r a n t ( N e x t ( t ) , j , a1 ) &
S t r o ng e r ( a , a1 ) &
/ / a1 i s t h e s t r o n g e s t p o s s i b l e
a u t h o r i z a t i o n t h a t j can g r a n t .
∼ ? a2 : ( c a n a c t i v e l y g r a n t ( N e x t ( t ) , j
, a2 ) & S t r o ng e r ( a , a2 ) &
S t r o ng e r ( a 2 , a1 ) ) . }
/ / Here we d e f i n e which l i n k s t o i n a c t i v a t e
under t h e d i f f e r e n t n e g a t i v e r e v o c a t i o n
schemes . The d e f i n i t i o n s a r e ana l ogous t o
t h e d e f i n i t i o n s of t h e d e l e t e p r e d i c a t e
f o r d e l e t e r e v o c a t i o n schemes .
{ i n a c t i v e ( N e x t ( t ) , i , j , a )<−a c t i o n ( t , s , i , j )&
pos pe rm(Nex t ( t ) , i , j , a ) &
( s =WLN | s=SLN | s=WGN | s=SGN) .
i n a c t i v e ( t , j , k , a )<−pos perm( t , j , k , a ) &
∼ c a n a c t i v e l y g r a n t ( t , j , a ) .
i n a c t i v e ( N e x t ( t ) , z , j , a )<−? i : a c t i o n ( t , r s
, i , j ) &
( r s =SLN | r s =SGN) &
pos perm( t , z , j , a ) &
∼ ? a1 : ( i n d ( t , z , i , a1 )& R(a1 , a ) ) .
i n a c t i v e ( N e x t ( t ) , z ,w, a )<−a c t i o n ( t , SGN, i
, j ) &
i n a c t i v e ( N e x t ( t ) , p ,w, a1 ) & ∼ i n a c t i v e ( t , p
,w, a1 )&
pos perm( t , z ,w, a ) &
∼ ? a2 : ( i n d ( t , z , i , a2 )& R(a2 , a ) ) .
i n a c t i v e ( N e x t ( t ) , i , j , a ) <− i n a c t i v e ( t , i , j , a
) &
pos pe rm(Nex t ( t ) , i , j , a ) . }
/ / When a n e g a t i v e r e v o c a t i o n scheme i s
g r a n t e d from i t o j , a n e g a t i v e p e rm i s s i o n
from i t o j i s c r e a t e d :
{ new neg perm(Next ( t ) , i , j )<−a c t i o n ( t , RS , i , j )
&
(RS = WLN | RS = SLN | RS=WGN | RS=
SGN) . }
{ pos pe rm(S t a r t , p1 , p2 , a )<−po s p e rm s t a r t ( p 1
, p2 , a ) .
po s pe rm(Nex t ( t ) , p1 , p2 , a )<−pos perm( t , p1
, p2 , a ) & ∼d e l e t e ( N e x t ( t ) , p1 , p2 , a ) .
po s pe rm(Nex t ( t ) , p1 , p2 , a )<−new(Nex t ( t ) ,
p1 , p2 , a ) . }
{ neg pe rm(S t a r t , p1 , p2 )<−neg pe rm s t a r t ( p1 , p2
) . / / i n i t i a t i n g neg−perm
neg pe rm(Nex t ( t ) , p1 , p2 )<−neg perm( t , p1 , p2 ) .
n eg pe rm(Nex t ( t ) , p1 , p2 )<−
new neg perm(Next ( t ) , p1 , p2 ) . }
{R(TT , TT) . R(TF , TF ) . R(TT , TF) . R(TT , FT ) .
R(TF , FF ) . R(TT , FF ) .}
{ S t ronger (TT , TF ) . S t ronger (TT , FT ) .
S t ronger (TT , FF ) . S t r onge r (TF , FF ) .
S t r onge r (FT , FF ) . }
{ Re l a t i on (TT , gran tTT ) . Re l a t i on (TF ,
gran tTT ) . Re l a t i on (FT , gran tTT ) .
Re l a t i on (FF , gran tTT ) . Re l a t i on (TF ,
gran tTF ) . Re l a t i on (FF , gran tTF ) .
Re l a t i on (FT , gran tFT ) . Re l a t i on (FF ,
g r an tFF ) . }
/ / At most one r e v o c a t i o n scheme a t eve r y Time
p o i n t .
?<2 s p1 p2 : a c t i o n ( t , s , p1 , p2 ) .
